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The relationship between gasoline prices and the demand for vehicle fuel e±ciency is im-
portant for environmental policy but poorly understood in the academic literature. We provide
empirical evidence that automobile manufacturers price as if consumers respond to gasoline
prices. We derive a reduced-form regression equation from theoretical micro-foundations and
estimate the equation with nearly 300,000 vehicle-week-region observations over the period 2003-
2006. We ¯nd that vehicle prices generally decline in the gasoline price. The decline is larger
for ine±cient vehicles, and the prices of particularly e±cient vehicles actually rise. Structural
estimation that ignores these e®ects underestimates consumer preferences for fuel e±ciency.1 Introduction
The combustion of gasoline in automobiles poses some of the most pressing policy concerns of
the early twenty-¯rst century. This combustion produces carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas that
contributes to global warming. It also limits the °exibility of foreign policy { more than sixty
percent of U.S. oil is imported, often from politically unstable regimes. These e®ects are classic
externalities. It is not clear whether, in the absence of intervention, the market is likely to produce
e±cient outcomes.
One topic of particular importance for policy in this arena is the extent to which retail gasoline
prices in°uence the demand for vehicle fuel e±ciency. If, for example, higher gasoline prices induce
consumers to shift toward more fuel e±cient vehicles, then 1) the recent run-up in gasoline prices
should partially mitigate the policy concerns outlined above and 2) gasoline and/or carbon taxes
may be reasonably e®ective policy instruments. However, a small empirical literature estimates an
inelastic consumer response to gasoline prices (e.g., Goldberg 1998; Bento et al 2005; Li, Timmins
and von Haefen 2007; Jacobsen 2008). For example, Shanjun Li, Christopher Timmins, and Roger
H. von Haefen conclude that:
[H]igher gasoline prices do not deter American's love a®air with large, relatively fuel-
ine±cient vehicles. Moreover, a politically feasible gasoline tax increase will likely not
generate signi¯cant improvements in °eet fuel economy.
Interestingly, the ¯ndings of the academic literature are seemingly contradicted by a bevy of recent
articles in the popular press. Consider Bill Vlasic's article in the New York Times titled \As Gas
Costs Soar, Buyers Flock to Small Cars":
Soaring gas prices have turned the steady migration by Americans to smaller cars into
a stampede. In what industry analysts are calling a ¯rst, about one in ¯ve vehicles sold
in the United States was a compact or subcompact car...1
One might be tempted to point out that four in ¯ve vehicles were neither compact nor subcompact
cars. But suppose that the spirit of the article is correct. Can its perspective be reconciled with
the academic literature?
We approach the topic from a new perspective. We ask the question: \Do automobile
manufacturers behave as if consumers respond to gasoline price?" Our approach starts with the
observation that consumer choices have implications for equilibrium automobile prices: if gasoline
price shocks a®ect consumer choices then one should see corresponding adjustments in automobile
prices. We derive the speci¯c form of these adjustments from theoretical micro foundations. In
particular, we show that a change in the gasoline price a®ects an automobile's equilibrium price
1The article appeared on May 2, 2008. Other recent press articles include CNN.com's May 23, 2008 article titled
\SUVs plunge toward `endangered' list," the LA Times' April 24, 2008 article titled \Fueling debate: Is $4.00 gas
the death of the SUV?" and the Chicago Tribune's May 12, 2008 article titled \SUVs no longer king of the road."through two main channels: its e®ect on the vehicle's fuel cost and its e®ect on the fuel cost of the
vehicle's competitors.2
To build intuition, consider the e®ect of an adverse gasoline price shock on the price of an
arbitrary automobile. If consumers respond to the vehicle's fuel cost, then the gasoline price shock
should reduce demand for the automobile. However, the gasoline price shock also increases the
fuel cost of the automobile's competitors and should therefore increase demand through consumer
substitution. The net e®ect on the automobile's equilibrium price is ambiguous. Overall, the
theory suggests that the net price e®ect should be negative for most automobiles, but positive for
automobiles that are su±ciently more fuel e±cient then their competitors. We believe that the
framework is quite intuitive. For example, the theory formalizes the idea that an adverse gasoline
price shock should reduce demand for fuel ine±cient automobiles (e.g., the GM Suburban) more
than demand for fuel e±cient automobiles (e.g., the Ford Taurus), and that demand for highly fuel
e±cient automobiles (e.g., the Toyota Prius) may actually increase.
In the empirical implementation, we test the extent to which automobile prices respond to
changes in fuel costs. We use a comprehensive set of manufacturer incentives to construct region-
time-speci¯c \manufacturer prices" for each of nearly 700 vehicles produced by GM, Ford, Chrysler,
and Toyota over the period 2003-2006, and combine information on these vehicles' attributes with
data on retail gasoline prices to measure fuel costs. We then regress manufacturer prices on fuel
costs and competitor fuel costs and argue that manufacturers set prices as if consumers respond
to the gasoline price if the ¯rst coe±cient is negative while the second is positive. Overall, the
estimation procedure uses information from nearly 300,000 vehicle-week-region observations; as we
discuss below, identi¯cation is feasible even in the presence of vehicle, time, and region ¯xed e®ects.
By way of preview, the results are consistent with a strong and statistically signi¯cant con-
sumer response to the retail price of gasoline. Manufacturer prices decrease in fuel costs but increase
in the fuel costs of competitors. The median net manufacturer price change in response to a hypo-
thetical one dollar increase in gasoline prices is a reduction of $792 for cars and a reduction of $981
for SUVs; the median price change for trucks and vans are modest and less statistically signi¯cant.
Although the fuel cost e®ect almost always dominates the competitor fuel cost e®ect, the manu-
facturer prices of some particularly fuel e±cient vehicles do increase (e.g., the 2006 Prius or the
2006 Escape Hybrid). The manufacturer responses that we estimate are large in magnitude. Rough
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that, for most vehicles, manufacturers substantially o®set
the discounted future gasoline expenditures incurred by consumers.
The results have important policy implications. The manufacturer price responses that we
2By \fuel cost" we mean the fuel expense associated with driving the vehicle. Notably, changes in the gasoline
price a®ect the fuel costs of automobiles di®erentially { the fuel costs of ine±cient automobiles are more responsive
to the gasoline prices than the fuel costs of e±cient automobiles. One can imagine that the gasoline price may a®ect
equilibrium automobile prices through other channels, perhaps due to an income e®ect and/or changes in production
costs. Our empirical framework allows us to control directly for these alternative channels; we ¯nd that their net
e®ect is small.
2document should dampen short-run changes in consumer purchase behavior by subsidizing relatively
fuel ine±cient vehicles when gasoline prices rise. Structural estimation that fails to control for
these manufacturer responses may therefore underestimate the short-run elasticity of demand with
respect to gasoline prices. Further, counter-factual policy simulations based on such estimation are
likely to understate the e®ects of gasoline prices or gasoline/carbon taxes, even if the simulations
allow for appropriate manufacturer responses.3
Thus, the evidence presented here may help reconcile the academic literature with the per-
spective of the popular press. That is, consumers may consider gasoline prices when choosing which
automobile to purchase but, due to the manufacturer price response, changes in the gasoline price
are not fully re°ected in observed vehicle purchases. We speculate that a major e®ect of gasoline
price changes (or gasoline/carbon taxes) may occur in the long-run. The manufacturer responses
that we estimate reduce the pro¯t margins of fuel ine±cient vehicles relative to those of fuel e±cient
vehicles. It is possible, therefore, that increases in the gasoline price (or in the gasoline/carbon tax)
provide a substantial pro¯t incentive for manufacturers to invest in the development and marketing
of fuel e±cient vehicles.
The paper proceeds as follows. We lay out the empirical model in Section 2, including the
underlying theoretical framework and the empirical implementation. We describe the data and
regression variables in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we present the main regression results and
discuss a number of extensions related to historical and futures gasoline prices, pricing dynamics,
selected demand and cost factors, and manufacturer inventory levels. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The Empirical Model
2.1 Theoretical framework
We derive our estimation equation from a model of Bertrand-Nash competition between multi-
vehicle manufacturers. Speci¯cally, we model manufacturers, = = 1;2;:::F that produce vehicles
j = 1;2;:::Jt in period t. Each manufacturer chooses prices that maximize their short-run pro¯t




[(pjt ¡ cjt) ¤ qjt ¡ fjt] (1)
where for each vehicle j and period t, the terms pjt, cjt, and qjt are the manufacturer price, the
marginal cost, and the quantity sold respectively; the term fjt is the ¯xed cost of production. As
we detail in the empirical implementation, we assume that marginal costs are constant in quantity
but responsive to certain exogenous cost shifters.4
We pair this pro¯t function with a consumer demand function that depends on manufacturer
3We formalize this argument in Appendix A.
4We abstract from the manufacturers' selections of vehicle attributes and °eet composition, as well as any entry
and/or exit, which we deem to be more important in longer-run analysis.
3prices, expected lifetime fuel costs, and exogenous demand shifters that capture vehicle attributes




®jk(pkt + xkt) + ¹jt; (2)
where the term ®jk is a demand parameter and the terms xkt and ¹jt capture the fuel costs
and the exogenous demand shifters, respectively. One can conceptualize the demand shifters as
including the vehicle's ¯xed attributes and quality, as well as maintenance costs and any other
expenses that are unrelated to the gasoline price. We consider the case in which demand is well
de¯ned (@qjt=@pjt = ®jj < 0) and vehicles are substitutes (@qjt=@pkt = ®jk ¸ 0 for k 6= j). The






®jk(pkt + xkt) + ¹jt +
X
k2=
®kj(pkt ¡ ckt) = 0: (3)
We solve these ¯rst-order equations for the equilibrium manufacturer prices as a function of the
exogenous factors.5 The resulting manufacturer \price rule" is a linear function of the fuel costs,































The coe±cients Á1;Á2;:::;Á9 are nonlinear functions of all the demand parameters. The price rule
makes it clear that the equilibrium price of a vehicle depends on its characteristics (i.e, its fuel cost,
marginal cost, and demand shifters), the characteristics of vehicles produced by competitors, and
the characteristics of other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer.6 For the time being, we
collapse the second line of the price rule into a vehicle-time-speci¯c constant, which we denote °jt.
The sheer number of terms in Equation 4 makes direct estimation infeasible. With only Jt
observations per period, one cannot hope to identify the J2
t fuel cost coe±cients, let alone the
5The solution technique is simple. Turning to vector notation, one can rearrange the ¯rst-order conditions such
that Ap = b, where A is a Jt £ Jt matrix of demand parameters, p is a Jt £ 1 vector of manufacturer prices, and b is
a Jt £1 vector of \solutions" that incorporate the fuel costs, marginal costs, and demand shifters. Provided that the
matrix A is nonsingular, Cramer's Rule applies and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which the equilibrium
manufacturer prices are linear functions of all the fuel costs, marginal costs, and demand shifters.
6We divide the terms into these three groups because Equation (3) can be rewritten:
®jj(2pjt + xjt ¡ cjt) +
X
k= 2=
®jk(pkt + xkt) +
X
l2=; l6=j
(®jl(plt + xlt) + ®lj(plt ¡ clt)) = 0;
in which each group has a distinctly di®erent functional form.
4vehicle-time-speci¯c constant. We move toward the empirical implementation by re-expressing the













jltxlt + °jt; (5)
where the weights !2
jkt and !3
jlt both sum to one in each period.7 Thus, the equilibrium price
depends on its fuel cost, the weighted average fuel cost of vehicles produced by competitors, and the
weighted average fuel cost of vehicles produced by the same manufacturer. Under a mild regularity
condition that we develop in Appendix B, the equilibrium manufacturer price of a vehicle decreases
in its fuel cost (i.e, Á1
jt 2 [¡1;0]) and increases in the weighted average fuel cost of vehicles produced
by competitors (i.e., Á2
jt 2 [0;1]). Further, the equilibrium price of a vehicle is more responsive to
changes in its fuel cost than identical changes to the weighted average fuel cost of its competitors
(i.e., jÁ1
jtj > jÁ2
jtj). The relationship between the equilibrium price of a vehicle and the weighted
average fuel cost of vehicles produced by the same manufacturer is ambiguous (i.e., Á3
jt 2 [¡1;1]).8
The intuition that manufacturer prices can increase or decrease in response to adverse gasoline
price shocks can now be formalized. Assume for the moment that the gasoline price does not
a®ect marginal costs or the demand shifters, and therefore does not a®ect the vehicle-time-speci¯c
constant (we relax this assumption in an extension). Denoting the gasoline price at time t as gpt,

























where fuel costs increase unequivocally in the gasoline price (i.e., @xjt=@gpt > 0 8 j). The ¯rst
term captures the intuition that manufacturers partially o®set an increase in the fuel cost with a
reduction in the vehicle's price. This reduction is greater for vehicles whose fuel costs are sensitive
to the gasoline price (e.g., for fuel-ine±cient vehicles). The second and third terms capture the
intuition that an increases in the fuel costs of other vehicles can increase demand (e.g., through
consumer substitution) and thereby raise the equilibrium price. Although the ¯rst e®ect tends to
dominate, prices can increase provided that the vehicle is su±ciently more fuel e±cient than other
vehicles.9






jt for i = 2;3, so that closer competitors















jkt for i = 2;3.
8As we show in Appendix B, if demand is symmetric (i.e., ®jk = ®kj 8 j;k), then changes in the fuel costs of
other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer have no e®ect on equilibrium prices, and Á
3
jt = 0.































Our starting point for estimation is the reduced-form outlined in Equation 5. The empirical im-
plementation requires that we specify the fuel costs (xjt), the weights (!i
jkt for i = 2;3), and the
vehicle-time-speci¯c constants (°jt). We discuss each in turn.
We proxy the expected lifetime fuel cost of vehicle j at time t as a function of the vehicle's
fuel e±ciency and the gasoline price at time t, following Goldberg (1998), Bento et al (2005) and
Jacobsen (2007). The speci¯c form is:




where mpgj is the fuel e±ciency of vehicle j in miles-per-gallon and ¿ is a discount factor that
nests any form of multiplicative discounting; one speci¯c possibility is ¿ = 1=(1¡±), where ± is the
\per-mile discount rate."10 The fuel cost proxy is precise if consumers perceive the gasoline price
to follow a random walk because, in that case, the current gasoline price is a su±cient statistic for
expectations over future gasoline prices. As we discuss below, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that gasoline prices actually follow a random walk, but also provide some evidence that consumers
consider both historical gasoline prices and futures prices when forming expectations.
To construct the weighted average variables, we assume that the severity of competition
between two vehicles decreases in the Euclidean distance between their attributes. To that end,
we take a set of M vehicle attributes, denoted zjm; m = 1;:::;M, and standardize each to have
a variance of one. Then, for each pair of vehicles, we sum the squared di®erences between each





m=1 (zjm ¡ zkm)2:
To form the ¯nal weights that we use in estimation, we ¯rst set the initial weights to zero for vehicles
of di®erent types and then normalize the weights to sum to one for each vehicle-period. We perform
this weighting procedure separately for vehicles produced by the same manufacturer and vehicles
produced by competitors; the result is a set of empirical weights that we denote e !2
jkt and e !3
jkt.11
The use of weights based on the Euclidean distance between vehicle attributes is analogous to the






jt ¼ 0 provided that
demand that is approximately symmetric.
10It may help intuition to note that the ratio of the gasoline price to vehicle miles-per-gallon is simply the gasoline
expense associated with a single mile of travel.
11Thus, the weighting scheme is based on the inverse Euclidean distance between vehicle attributes among vehicles
of the same type. There are four vehicle types in the data: cars, SUVs, trucks and vans. We use the following set of
vehicle attributes in the initial weights: manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP), miles-per-gallon, wheel base,
horsepower, passenger capacity, and dummies for the vehicle type and segment. Although the initial weights are
constant across time for any vehicle pair, the ¯nal weights may vary due to changes in the set of vehicles available on
the market. An alternative weighting scheme based on the inverse Euclidean distance of all vehicles (not just those
of the same type) produces similar results.
6instrumenting procedures of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Train and Winston (2007).
Turning to the vehicle-time-speci¯c constants, recall from that Equation (4) that the con-




















In the empirical implementation, we decompose this function using vehicle ¯xed e®ects, time ¯xed
e®ects, and controls for the number of weeks that each vehicle has been on the market. Let ¸jt
denote the number of weeks that vehicle j has been on the market as of period t, and ¹ ¸A;t denote
the weighted average number of weeks since the vehicles in the set A were ¯rst produced. The
decomposition takes the form:
°jt = ±t + ·j + f(¸jt) + g(¹ ¸k= 2=;t) + h(¹ ¸k2=; k6=j;t) + ²jt
where ±t and ·j are time and vehicle ¯xed e®ects, respectively, and functions f, g, and h °exibly
capture the net price e®ects of learning-by doing and predictable demand changes over the model-
year.12 In the main results, we specify the functions f, g, and h as third-order polynomials; the
results are robust to the use of higher-order or lower-order polynomials. The error term ²jt captures
vehicle-time-speci¯c cost and demand shocks.
Two ¯nal adjustments produce the main regression equation that we take to the data. First,
we incorporate regional variation in manufacturer prices and gasoline prices and add a correspond-
ing set of region ¯xed e®ects.13 Second, we impose a homogeneity constraint that reduces the
total number of parameters to be estimated; the constraint eliminates vehicle-time variation in the
coe±cients, so that Ái
jt = Ái 8 j;t (in supplementary regressions we permit the coe±cients to vary
across manufacturers and vehicle types). The regression equation is:














+ f(¸jt) + g(¹ ¸k= 2=;t) + h(¹ ¸k2=; k6=j;t) + ±t + ·j + ´r + ²jt; (7)
where the fuel cost coe±cients incorporate the discount factor, i.e., ¯i = ¿Ái for i = 1;2;3; for
reasonable discount factors, these coe±cients should be much larger than one in magnitude. Thus,
we estimate the average response of a vehicle's price to changes in its fuel costs, changes in the
weighted average fuel cost among vehicles produced by competitors, and changes in the weighted
average fuel cost among other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer.
12Copeland, Dunn and Hall (2005) document that vehicles prices fall approximately nine percent over the course
of the model-year.
13Adding regional variation in prices does not complicate the weight calculations because there is no regional
variation in the vehicles available to consumers.
7We estimate Equation 7 using ordinary least squares. We are able to identify the fuel cost
coe±cients in the presence of time, vehicle, and region ¯xed e®ects precisely because changes in
the gasoline price across time and regions a®ects manufacturer prices di®erentially across vehicles.
We argue that manufacturers price as if consumers respond to gasoline prices if the fuel cost
coe±cient is negative (i.e., ¯1 < 0) and the competitor fuel cost coe±cient is positive (i.e., ¯2 > 0).
The theoretical results suggest that the fuel cost coe±cient should be larger in magnitude than
the competitor fuel cost coe±cient (i.e.,
¯ ¯¯1¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯¯2¯ ¯); more generally, the relative magnitude of
these coe±cients determines the extent to which average manufacturer prices fall in response to
an adverse gasoline shock. We cluster the standard errors at the vehicle level, which accounts for
arbitrary correlation patterns in the error terms.14
3 Data Sources and Regression Variables
3.1 Data sources
Our primary source of data is Autodata Solutions, a marketing research company that maintains
a comprehensive database of manufacturer incentive programs. We have access to the programs
o®ered by Toyota and the \Big Three" U.S. manufacturers { GM, Ford, and Chrysler { over the
period 2003-2006.15 There are just over 190,000 cash incentive-vehicle pairs in the data. Each lasts
a ¯xed period of time, and provides cash to consumers (\consumer-cash") or dealerships (\dealer-
cash") at the time of purchase.16 The incentive programs may be national, regional, or local in
their geographic scope; we restrict our attention to the national and regional programs.17 Thus, we
are able to track how manufacturer incentives change over time and across regions for each vehicle
in the data.
By \vehicle," we mean a particular model in a particular model-year. For example, the 2003
Ford Taurus is one vehicle in the data, and we consider it as distinct from the 2004 Ford Taurus.
Overall, there are 681 vehicles in the data { 293 cars, 202 SUVs, 105 trucks, and 81 vans. The
data have information on the attributes of each, including MSRP, miles-per-gallon, horsepower,
wheel base, and passenger capacity.18 We impute the period over which each vehicle is available to
14The results are robust to the use of brand-level or segment-level clusters. Brands and vehicle segments are ¯ner
gradations of the manufacturers and vehicle types, respectively. There are 21 brands and 15 vehicle segments in the
data. Examples of brands (and their manufacturer) include Chevrolet (GM), Dodge (Chrysler), Mercury (Ford), and
Lexus (Toyota). Examples of vehicle segments include compact cars, luxury SUVs, and large pick-ups. The results
are also robust to the use of manufacturer and vehicle type clusters, though the small number of manufacturers and
vehicle types makes the asymptotic consistency of the standard errors suspect.
15The German manufacturer Daimler owned Chrysler over this period. We exclude Mercedes-Benz from this
analysis since it is traditionally associated with Daimler rather than Chrysler.
16Consumer cash includes both \Stand-Alone Retail Cash" and \Bonus Cash."
17We consider an incentive to be regional if it is available across an entire Energy Information Agency region. We
exclude incentives that are available in only a single city or state.
18Attributes sometimes di®er for a given vehicle due to the existence of di®erent option packages, also known as
\trim." When more than one set of attributes exists for a vehicle, we use the attributes corresponding to the trim
8consumers as beginning with the start date of production, as given in Ward's Automotive Yearbook,
and ending after the last incentive program for that vehicle expires.19 For each vehicle, we construct
observations over the relevant period at the week-region level.
We combine the Autodata Solutions data with information from the Energy Information
Agency (EIA) on weekly retail gasoline prices in each of ¯ve distinct geographic regions. The
EIA surveys retail gasoline outlets every Monday for the per gallon pump price paid by consumers
(inclusive of all taxes).20 In addition to the regional measures, the EIA calculates an average
national price. Figure 1 plots these retail gasoline prices over 2003-2006 (in real 2006 dollars).
A run-up in gasoline prices over the sample period is apparent. For example, the mean national
gasoline price is 1.75 dollars-per-gallon in 2003 and 2.57 dollars-per-gallon in 2006. The sharp
upward spike around September 2005 is due to Hurricane Katrina, which temporarily eliminated
more than 25 percent of US crude oil production and 10-15 percent of the US re¯nery capacity
(EIA 2006). Although gasoline prices tend to move together across regions, we are able to exploit
limited geographic variation to strengthen identi¯cation.
We purge the gasoline prices of seasonality prior to their use in the analysis. Since automobile
manufacturers adjust their prices cyclically over vehicle model-years (e.g., Copeland, Hall, and
Dunn 2005), the presence of seasonality in gasoline prices is potentially confounding. Further, the
use of time ¯xed e®ects alone may be insu±cient in dealing with seasonality because gasoline prices
a®ect the fuel costs of each vehicle di®erentially (e.g., Equation 7). We employ the X-12-ARIMA
program, which is state-of-the-art and commonly employed elsewhere, for example by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to deseasonalize inputs to the consumer price index.21 Figure 2 plots the resulting
deseasonalized national gasoline prices together with the seasonal adjustments. As shown, the
program adjusts the gasoline price downward during the summer months and upwards during the
winter months. The magnitude of the adjustments increases with gasoline prices.
In an extension (presented in Section 4.2), we explore whether consumers consider historical
and futures prices when forming expectations about future gasoline prices. Interestingly, statistical
tests based on Dicky and Fuller (1979) fail to reject the null that gasoline prices follow a random
walk { the p-statistic for the deseasonalized national time-series is 0.7035 and the p-statistics for the
deseasonalized regional time-series are similar. These tests suggest that knowledge of the current
with the lowest MSRP.
19The start date of production is unavailable for some vehicles. For those cases, we set the start date at August 1
of the previous year. For example, we set the start date of the 2006 Civic Hybrid to be August 1, 2005. We impose
a maximum period length of 24 months. In robustness checks, we used an 18 month maximum; the di®erent period
lengths did not a®ect the results.
20The survey methodology is detailed online at the EIA webpage. The regions include the East Coast, the Gulf
Coast, the Midwest, the Rocky Mountains, and the West Coast.
21We use data on gasoline prices over 1993-2008 to improve the estimation of seasonal factors, and adjust each
national and regional time-series independently. We specify multiplicative decomposition, which allows the e®ect of
seasonality to increase with the magnitude of the trend-cycle. The results are robust to log-additive and additive
decompositions. For more details on the X-12-ARIMA, see Makridakis, Wheelwright and Hyndman (1998) and Miller
and Williams (2004).
9gasoline price is su±cient to inform predictions over future gasoline prices. The result is consistent
with the academic literature and statements of industry experts. For example, Alquist and Kilian
(2008) ¯nd that the current spot price of crude oil outperforms sophisticated forecasting models
as a predictor of future spot prices, and Peter Davies, the chief economist of British Petroleum,
has stated that \we cannot forecast oil prices with any degree of accuracy over any period whether
short or long..." (Davies 2007). If consumers form expectations e±ciently, therefore, one would
not expect historical and/or futures prices of gasoline to in°uence vehicle purchase decisions.
3.2 Regression variables
The two critical variables that enable regression analysis are manufacturer price and fuel cost.
We discuss each in turn. To start, we measure the manufacturer price of each vehicle as MSRP
minus the mean incentive available for the given week and region. We also show results in which
the variable includes only regional incentives and only national incentives, respectively. From an
econometric standpoint, the MSRP portion of the variable is irrelevant for estimation because the
vehicle ¯xed e®ects are collinear (MSRP is constant for all observations on a given vehicle). It
is the variation in manufacturer incentives across vehicles, weeks, and regions that identi¯es the
regression coe±cients.
At least two important caveats apply to our manufacturer price variable. First, the variable
does not capture any information about ¯nal transaction prices, which are negotiated between the
consumers and the dealerships. Changes in negotiating behavior could dampen or accentuate the
e®ect we estimate between gasoline prices and manufacturer prices. Second, although we observe
the incentive programs, we do not observe the actual incentives selected. In some circumstances,
it is possible that consumers may stack multiple incentives or choose between di®erent incentives.
To the extent that manufacturers are more lenient in allowing consumers to stack incentives when
gasoline prices are high, our regression estimates are conservative relative to the true manufacturer
response.22
We measure the fuel costs of each vehicle as the gasoline price divided by the miles-per-
gallon of the vehicle. As discussed above, this has the interpretation of being the gasoline expense
associated with a single mile of travel. Since the gasoline price varies at the week and region levels
and miles-per-gallon varies at the vehicle level, fuel costs vary at the vehicle-week-region level. In
an extension, we construct alternative fuel costs based on 1) the mean of the gasoline price over the
previous four weeks and 2) the price of one-month futures contract for retail gasoline. The futures
data are derived from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and are publicly available
from the EIA.23 The alternative variables permit tests for whether consumers are backward-looking
22To check the sensitivity of the results, we construct a number of alternative variables that measure manufacturer
prices: 1) MSRP minus the maximum incentive, 2) MSRP minus the mean consumer-cash incentive, 3) MSRP minus
the mean dealer-cash incentive, and 4) MSRP minus the mean publicly available incentive. None of these alternative
dependent variables substantially change the results.
23We use one-month futures contracts for reformulated regular gasoline at the New York harbor. In order to ensure
10and forward-looking, respectively.
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations for the manufacturer price and the gasoline
price variables, as well as for ¯ve vehicle attributes used in the weighting scheme { MSRP, miles-
per-gallon, horsepower, wheel base, and passenger capacity. The statistics are calculated from the
299,855 vehicle-region-week observations formed from the 681 vehicles, 208 weeks, and ¯ve regions
in the data. As shown, the mean manufacturer price is 30.344 (in thousands). The mean fuel cost is
0.108, so that gasoline expenses average roughly eleven cents per mile. The means of MSRP, miles-
per-gallon, horsepower, wheel base, and passenger capacity are 30.782, 21.555, 224.123, 115.193,
and 4.911, respectively.
Table 2 shows the means of these variables, calculated separately for each vehicle type. On
average, cars are less expensive than SUVs but more expensive than trucks and vans. The mean
manufacturer price for the four vehicle types are 30.301, 35.301, 24.482, and 24.658, respectively.
Cars also require far less gasoline expense per mile. The mean fuel cost of 0.087 is nearly thirty
percent smaller than the means of 0.121, 0.133, and 0.120 for SUVs, trucks, and vans, respectively.
The means of the attributes used in the weights also di®er across type, and re°ect the generalization
that cars are smaller, more fuel e±cient, and less powerful than SUVs, trucks, and vans. Of course,
the vehicles also di®er along unobserved dimensions. We use vehicle ¯xed e®ects to control for all
these di®erences { observed and unobserved { in our regression analysis.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Main regression results
We regress manufacturer prices on fuel costs, as speci¯ed in Equation 7. To start, we impose the
full homogeneity constraint that all vehicles share the same fuel cost coe±cients. The estimated
coe±cients are the average response of manufacturer prices to fuel costs. Table 3 presents the re-
sults. In Column 1, we use the baseline manufacturer price { MSRP minus the mean of the regional
and national incentives. In Columns 2 and 3, we use MSRP minus the mean regional incentive and
MSRP minus the mean national incentive, respectively. Although the ¯rst column may provide
more meaningful coe±cients, we believe that the second and third columns are interesting insofar
as they examine whether manufacturers respond at the regional and national levels, respectively.
As shown, the fuel cost coe±cients of -55.40, -56.96, and -63.75 are precisely estimated and
capture the intuition that manufacturers adjust their prices to o®set changes in fuel costs. The
competitor fuel cost coe±cients of 50.76, 50.16, and 50.09 are also precisely estimated and support
the idea that increases in competitors' fuel costs raise demand due to consumer substitution. In
each regression, the magnitude of the fuel cost coe±cient exceeds that of the competitor fuel cost
that the regression coe±cients are easily comparable, we normalize the futures price to have the same global mean
over the period as the national retail gasoline price.
11coe±cient, which is suggestive that the ¯rst e®ect dominates for most vehicles.24 We make this
more explicit shortly. The same-¯rm fuel cost coe±cients are nearly zero and not statistically
signi¯cant.25 Finally, a comparison of coe±cients across columns suggests that manufacturers
adjust their prices similarly at the regional and national levels in response to changes in fuel
costs.26
We explore the e®ect of retail gasoline prices on manufacturer prices in Figure 3. The gasoline
price enters through the fuel costs, average competitor fuel costs, and average same-¯rm fuel costs.




















We plot these derivatives (in thousands) on the vertical axis against vehicle miles-per-gallon on
the horizontal axis. We focus on the ¯rst dependent variable, i.e., MSRP minus the mean regional
and national incentive.27 The median e®ect of a one dollar increase in the gasoline price per gallon
is a reduction in the manufacturer price of $171. The calculation varies greatly across vehicles {
for example, the e®ects range from a reduction of $1,506 for the 2005 GM Montana SV6 to a rise
of $998 for the 2006 Toyota Prius. Although the manufacturer price drops for 83 percent of the
vehicles, the price response for fuel e±cient vehicles tends to be less negative, and the prices of
extremely fuel e±cient vehicles such as hybrids actually increase. Overall, the own fuel cost e®ect
dominates the competitor fuel cost e®ect for most vehicles; the converse is true only for vehicles
that are substantially more fuel e±cient than their competitors.
We use sub-sample regressions to relax the homogeneity constraint that all vehicles share the
same fuel cost coe±cients. In particular, we regress manufacturer prices on the fuel cost variables
for each combination of vehicle type (cars, SUVs, trucks, and vans) and manufacturer (GM, Ford,
Chrysler, and Toyota). The sub-sample regressions may be informative, for example, if the market
for cars is more (or less) competitive than the market for SUVs, if region- and time-speci¯c cost and
demand shocks a®ect cars and SUVs di®erentially, or if consumers who purchase di®erent vehicle
types are heterogeneous (for instance if they drive di®erent mileage or have di®erent discount
factors).28 For expositional brevity we focus solely on the baseline manufacturer price and present
24The fuel cost coe±cients contribute substantially to the regression ¯ts. For example, the R
2 of Column 1 is
reduced from 0.5260 to 0.4133 when the fuel cost variables are removed from the speci¯cation, so that changes in
vehicle fuel costs explain more than ten percent of the variance in manufacturer prices.
25As we develop in Appendix B, this is consistent with demand being roughly symmetric.
26The results to not seem to be driven by outliers; the coe±cients are similar when we exclude the extremely fuel
e±cient or fuel ine±cient vehicles from the sample.
27We plot each vehicle only once because the derivatives do not vary substantially over time or regions. Indeed,
the only variation within vehicles is due to changes in the set of other vehicles available.
28One might additionally suspect that the response of manufacturer prices to fuel costs changes over time. To test
for such heterogeneity, we split the observations to form one sub-sample over the period 2003-2004 and another over
the period 2005-2006; the results from each sub-sample are quite close. Similarly, we divide the sample between the
2003-2004 model-years and the 2005-2006 model-years without substantially changing the results. We conclude that
12the results using ¯gures. The regression coe±cients appear in Appendix Table A-1.
Figure 4 plots the estimated e®ects of a one dollar increase in the gasoline price on manu-
facturer prices against vehicle miles-per-gallon, separately for each vehicle type.29 Converted into
dollars, the median estimated e®ect is a reduction in the manufacturer price of $779, $981, and
$174 for cars, SUVs, and trucks, respectively, and an increase of $91 for vans. Among cars and
SUVs, the fuel cost e®ect almost always dominates the competitor fuel cost e®ect: 91 percent of
the cars and 95 percent of the SUVs feature negative net e®ects. Still, the estimated manufacturer
price response is less negative for more fuel e±cient vehicles, so that the univariate correlation co-
e±cient between the price response and miles-per-gallon is 0.6610 for cars and 0.7521 for SUVs.30
By contrast, the magnitude of the estimated e®ects are much smaller for trucks and vans, as is the
strength of the relationship between the e®ects and vehicle fuel e±ciency.
In order to provide some sense of the economic magnitude of these results, we use back-of-
the-envelope calculations to (roughly) estimate the extent to which manufacturers o®set changes
in consumers' cumulative gasoline expenses. We assume an annual discount rate of ¯ve percent,
a vehicle holding period of thirteen years, and a utilization rate of 11,154 miles per year (the
Department of Transportation estimates an average vehicle lifespan of thirteen years and 145,000
miles). Under these parameters, the cumulative gasoline expense associated with a one dollar
increase in the gasoline prices ranges between $1,972 and $7,953 among the sample vehicles; the
expense for the median vehicle (miles-per-gallon of 21.40) is $5,073. We divide the estimated
manufacturer responses, based on the regression coe±cients shown in Appendix Table A-1, by the
computed cumulative gasoline expense. The resulting ratio is the percent of cumulative gasoline
expenses, due to a change in the retail gasoline price, that is o®set by changes in the manufacturer
price.
Figure 5 plots this \o®set percentage" against vehicle miles-per-gallon, separately for each
vehicle type. The median o®set percentage is 18.17 and 15.27 for cars and SUVs, respectively, but
climbs as high as 52.17 for cars (the 2006 Ford GT) and as high as 33.92 for SUVs (the 2004 GM
Envoy XUV). These percentages fall in vehicle fuel e±ciency, so that the univariate correlation
coe±cients between the o®set percentage and miles-per-gallon for cars and SUVs are -0.6292 and
-0.6681, respectively. By contrast, the o®set percentage is smaller for trucks and vans. We wish
to emphasize that these numbers should be interpreted with considerable caution. Alternative
assumptions regarding the discount rate, the vehicle holding period, and the utilization rate could
push the o®set percentages higher or lower. Further, as previously discussed, the manufacturer price
we use to estimate the regressions { MSRP minus the mean available incentive { could understate
the manufacturer responses and the o®set percentages if some consumers stack multiple incentives.
Returning the regression results of Appendix Table A-1, in Figure 6 we plot the estimated
the e®ects of any time-related heterogeneity are relatively small.
29Each plot combines the results of four regressions, one for each manufacturer.
30Appendix Table A-2 lists the largest positive and negative price e®ects for both cars and SUVs.
13manufacturer price e®ects against vehicle miles-per-gallon for cars, separately for each manufac-
turer. The estimated e®ects are negative for all GM and Ford cars, and negative for 92 percent of
the Toyota cars (all but the 2003 Echo and the four Prius vehicles). Converted into dollars, the
median estimated e®ect for these manufacturers is a reduction in price of $610, $1180, and $758,
respectively. By contrast, only 38 percent of the Chrysler estimated e®ects are negative and the
median e®ect is an increase of $107. This di®erence between Chrysler and the other manufactur-
ers remains even for a given level of fuel e±ciency. For example, the mean e®ects for cars with
between 25 and 35 miles-per-gallon are reductions of $529, $843, and $719, respectively, for GM,
Ford and Toyota, but an increase of $239 for Chrysler. One might conclude that Chrysler pursues
a di®erent pricing strategy than GM, Ford, and Toyota. However, an alternative explanation is
that Chrysler vehicles are simply more fuel e±cient than their competitors (e.g., Chrysler vehicles
could be closer to ine±cient vehicles in attribute space). We compare the manufacturers' pricing
rules more explicitly in Section 4.2.
We plot the estimated manufacturer price e®ects among SUVs separately for each manufac-
turer in Figure 7. Among the GM, Ford, and Toyota SUVs, the estimated price e®ects are positive
for only four vehicles: the 2006 (Ford) Mercury Mariner Hybrid, the 2006 Ford Escape Hybrid,
the 2006 Toyota Highlander Hybrid and the 2006 Lexus RX 400 Hybrid. The median estimated
e®ects for GM, Ford, and Toyota are reductions in price of $1315, $663, and $754, respectively. The
price e®ects are more negative for fuel ine±cient SUVs. By contrast, the estimated price e®ects
are positive for nearly 30 percent of the Chrysler SUVs and the price e®ects are actually more
negative for fuel e±cient SUVs.31 The unexpected pattern among Chrysler SUVs exists because
the estimated fuel cost coe±cient is positive and the competitor fuel cost coe±cient is negative (see
Appendix Table A-1), inconsistent with the pro¯t maximizing pricing rule derived in the theoretical
framework.
4.2 Extensions
4.2.1 Lagged retail gasoline prices and gasoline futures
The main results are based on the premise that consumers form expectations about future retail
gasoline prices based on current retail gasoline prices. We explore that premise here. In particular,
we examine whether manufacturers set vehicle prices in response to information on historical gaso-
line prices and gasoline futures prices. We construct two new sets of fuel cost variables. The ¯rst
uses the mean retail gasoline price over the previous four weeks, and the second uses the one-month
futures price for retail gasoline. To the extent that consumers are backward-looking and forward-
looking, respectively, manufacturers should adjust vehicle prices to these new fuel cost variables.
The units of observation are at the vehicle-week level; we discard regional variation because futures
31The univariate correlation coe±cients between the price e®ects and miles-per-gallon are 0.9062, 0.8584, and
0.9447 for GM, Ford, and Toyota, respectively, and -0.1765 for Chrysler.
14prices are available only at the national level. The results are therefore comparable to Column 3
of Table 3.
Table 4 presents the regression results. Columns 1 and 2 include variables based on mean
lagged gasoline prices and gasoline futures prices, respectively. The fuel cost coe±cients are -64.55
and -47.66; the competitor fuel cost coe±cients are 50.01 and 63.32. The coe±cients are statistically
signi¯cant and consistent with the theoretical model. Still, the more interesting question is whether
these variables matter after controlling for the current price of retail gasoline. Columns 3 and 4
include variables based on mean lagged gasoline prices and gasoline futures prices, respectively,
together with variables based on the current gasoline price. Each of the coe±cients takes the
expected sign and statistical signi¯cance is maintained for all but two coe±cients. Finally, Column
5 includes variables based on mean lagged gasoline prices and variables based on gasoline futures
prices. The coe±cients are precisely estimated and again take the correct sign.
The ¯nding that consumers may use historical gasoline prices and gasoline futures prices to
form expectations for gasoline prices is interesting, in part because both the empirical evidence
and the conventional wisdom of industry experts suggest that gasoline prices follow a random walk
(as we outline Section 3). One could argue that some consumers form ine±cient expectations
for future gasoline prices. Alternatively, some consumers may be imperfectly informed about the
current gasoline price; these consumers could rationally turn to alternative sources of information,
such as historical prices and/or futures prices. We are skeptical that our data can untangle these
informal hypotheses and hope that future research better addresses the topic.
4.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, we examine manufacturer price responses for hypothetical, \perfectly average"
vehicles. We de¯ne a perfectly average vehicle as one whose miles-per-gallon, weighted-average
competitor miles-per-gallon, and weighted-average same-¯rm miles-per-gallon are all at the mean
(for cars the mean is 25.99; for SUVs it is 18.80). Hypothetical vehicles are advantageous for
comparisons of manufacturers because they strip away the vehicle heterogeneity that may not be
apparent in the main results (e.g., Figures 6 and 7); one can essentially compare the performance
of manufacturer price rules under identical circumstances.32
We use impulse response functions to track the e®ects of a gasoline price shock, during the
week of the shock and each of the following ten weeks. The approach may be of additional interest
to the extent that it captures dynamics. To compute the impulse response function, we add ten
lags of each fuel cost variable to the baseline speci¯cation, and estimate the speci¯cation separately
for the cars and SUVs of each manufacturer. We then calculate the predicted e®ects of a one dollar
increase in the gasoline price for the perfectly average car and SUV (in principle, one could examine
32For example, based on Figure 6 alone, it is not clear whether Chrysler employs a fundamentally di®erent pricing
rule than GM, Ford, and Toyota, or whether its vehicles are simply more fuel e±cient than their competitors (e.g.,
they could be closer to ine±cient vehicles in attribute space).
15any hypothetical vehicle).
Figure 9 shows the results.33 Starting with the cars, GM, Ford, and Toyota reduce prices by
$516, $495, and $691, respectively, immediately following the gasoline price shock, while Chrysler
increases prices by $106. The discrepancies between the manufacturer grow steadily over the
following ten weeks; by the ¯nal week, the net price changes are reductions of $1,495, $2,767,
$1,673, and $21 for GM, Ford, Toyota, and Chrysler, respectively. Turning to the SUVs, GM,
Ford, and Toyota reduce their prices by $121, $105, and $569, respectively, immediately following
the gasoline shock, while Chrysler increases prices by $63. Again, the discrepancies between the
manufacturer grow steadily over the following weeks; by the ¯nal week, the net price changes are
reductions of $831, $612, $1,422, and $72 for GM, Ford, Toyota, and Chrysler, respectively. Overall,
Ford reacts most aggressively relative to the other manufacturers in adjusting its car prices; Toyota
reacts most aggressively for SUVs. Chrysler's reactions are negligible for both vehicle types.
Two of the results merit further discussion. First, we ¯nd Chrysler's price responses puzzling
because the theoretical framework indicates that demand for the perfectly average vehicle must
fall in response to an adverse gasoline shock.34 We are reticent to conclude that Chrysler's pricing
rule is suboptimal, however, in the absence of more sure evidence. It is possible that Chrysler's
consumers are distinctly unresponsive to fuel costs, or that Chrysler adjusts its prices without using
incentives.35 Second, the result that manufacturer prices continue to fall after the initial gasoline
price shock is consistent with the hypothesis that consumers internalize gasoline price shocks slowly
over time. The result could also be consistent with some forms of dynamic competition or certain
supply-side frictions; we leave the exploration of these possibilities to future research.
4.2.3 Demand and cost factors
In the main regressions we estimate a separate time ¯xed e®ect for each of the 208 weeks in the data.
These ¯xed e®ects capture the combined in°uence of demand and cost factors that change over time
through the sample period. In this section, we use a second-stage regression to decompose the ¯xed
e®ects into contributions from speci¯c time-varying demand and cost factors. We are particularly
interested in whether the retail gasoline price a®ects manufacturer prices after having controlled
for its impact on vehicle fuel costs. Such an e®ect could be present if higher gasoline prices increase
manufacturer production costs or reduce consumer demand through an income e®ect.36 One might
33Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4 provide the regression coe±cients. The individual coe±cients are di±cult to
interpret due to the high degree of co-linearity among the 33 fuel cost regressors, but the net manufacturer price
e®ects are reasonable, easily interpretable, and consistent with the main results.





jtj. In the main regression results, shown in Table A-1, this holds for GM, Ford, and Toyota, but not
for Chrysler.
35Chrysler dealerships may adjust prices. We note, however, that our data include cash incentives paid to both
consumers (\consumer-cash") and dealerships (\dealer-cash").
36For example, Gicheva, Hastings, and Villas-Boas (2007) identify an income e®ect of gasoline prices using scanner
data on grocery purchases.
16expect these two channels to partially o®set; we can identify only the net e®ect.
Figure 8 plots the time ¯xed e®ects estimated in Column 3 of Table 3, together with the prime
interest rate and the unemployment rate (which may shift demand), price indices for electricity
and steel (which may shift manufacturer costs), and the retail gasoline price (which may shift
demand and costs). The ¯xed e®ects units are in thousands, so that a ¯xed e®ect of 0.25 represents
manufacturer prices that are $250 on average higher than manufacturer prices during the ¯rst
week of 2003 (the base date). The ¯xed e®ects are higher in the winter months than in the summer
months, consistent with the notion that manufacturer prices fall as consumers anticipate the arrival
of new vehicles to the market in the summer months (e.g., Copeland, Dunn, and Hall 2005). The
prime interest rate increases over the sample while unemployment decreases; the means of these
variables are 5.64 and 5.30, respectively. The electricity and steel indices are de¯ned relative to
January 1, 2003; the prices of these cost factors increase over the sample by 10 and 61 percent,
respectively. The mean gasoline price is $2.16 per gallon, and gasoline prices increase over the
sample.37
We regress the estimated time ¯xed e®ects on di®erent combinations of the demand and
cost factors.38 Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 features only the gasoline price, Column 2
features the gasoline price and the other demand factors, Column 3 features gasoline price and the
other cost factors, and Column 4 features all ¯ve demand and cost factors. The coe±cients are
remarkably stable across speci¯cations. In each column, the gasoline price coe±cient is small and
statistically indistinguishable from zero; gasoline prices appear to have little e®ect on manufacturer
prices after controlling for vehicle fuel costs. The remaining coe±cients take the expected signs.
Based on the Column 4 regression, a one percentage point increase in prime interest rate reduces
manufacturer prices by $164 and a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate reduces
manufacturer prices by $104 (though the latter e®ect is not statistically signi¯cant). Similarly, ten
percent increases in the prices of electricity and steel raise manufacturer prices by $283 and $55,
respectively.
4.2.4 Vehicle inventories
We use the assumption that manufacturers have full information about consumer demand condi-
tions to generate a simple linear pricing rule. It is not clear whether the assumption is appropriate.
For example, manufacturers may receive only noisy signals about demand, and accurate informa-
37The electricity index is publicly available from the EIA, and the steel index is publicly available from Producer
Price Index maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We deseasonalize both indices using the X12-ARIMA
prior to their use in analysis.
38Each regression includes week ¯xed e®ects to help control for seasonality. To be clear, we estimate 52 week ¯xed
e®ects using 208 weekly observations; equivalent weeks in each year are constrained to have the same ¯xed e®ect. We
use the Newey and West (1987) variance matrix to account for ¯rst-order autocorrelation. The standard errors do
not change substantially when we account for higher-order autocorrelation. We are unable to use the more general
clustering correction because the data lack cross-sectional variation. Of course, the standard errors may be too small
because the dependent variable is estimated in a prior stage.
17tion may be costly to obtain. In such an environment, one might expect manufacturers to set their
prices primarily based on their observed inventories; demand conditions would a®ect prices only
indirectly. As a speci¯cation test, we re-estimate the empirical model controlling for inventories.
The main theoretical framework { and its simple pricing rule { should gain credibility if the fuel
cost coe±cients remain important.
To implement the test, we collect data on the \days supply" of inventory from Automotive
News, a major trade publication. Days supply is the current inventory divided by sales during the
previous month (the units are easily converted from months to days). The measure is frequently
used in industry analysis (e.g., Windecker 2003). Intuitively, the days supply should be high when
demand is sluggish and low when demand is great. The units of observation are at the month-model
level. To be clear, the inventories data do not vary across weeks within a month, and the data
lump all vehicles within a given model (e.g., the 2003 Dodge Neon and 2004 Dodge Neon). We map
the data into the main regression sample by using cubic splines to interpolate weekly observations.
We then apply the days supply to every vehicle in the model category. The procedure generates a
regression sample of 500 vehicles and 41,822 vehicle-week observations.39
Table 6 presents the regression results. In Column 1, we re-estimate the same speci¯cation as
in Table 3, Column 3 using only those observations for which we have information on inventories.
The fuel cost and competitor fuel cost coe±cients are -69.23 and 53.16, respectively.40 We add
the days supply measure to the speci¯cation in Column 2. The fuel cost and competitor fuel cost
coe±cients of -69.11 and 53.00 are virtually unchanged.41 The result suggests that manufacturers
respond to changes in demand conditions before these changes a®ect inventories; one might infer
that manufacturers are well informed about consumer preferences. The result also strengthens our
interpretation of the main empirical results: manufacturers intentionally set prices as if consumers
respond to gasoline prices.
5 Conclusion
We provide empirical evidence that automobile manufacturers adjust vehicle prices in response to
changes in the price of retail gasoline. In particular, we show that the vehicle prices tend to decrease
in their own fuel costs and increase in the fuel costs of their competitors. The net e®ect is such that
adverse gasoline price shocks reduce the price of most vehicles but raise the price of particularly fuel
e±cient vehicles. We argue, based on theoretical micro foundations, that these empirical results are
39We have inventory data for 500 of the 589 domestic vehicles in the data; the Toyota data are insu±ciently




th percentiles are 62.26, 84.63, and 109.42, respectively.
40The fact that these coe±cients are close to those produced by the full sample provides some comfort that the
smaller inventory sample does not introduce sample selection problems or other complexities.
41The days supply coe±cient is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. We are wary of interpreting this
coe±cient too strongly because inventories may be correlated with the vehicle-time speci¯c cost and demand shocks
that compose the error term in the regression equation.
18consistent with the notion that automobile manufacturers set prices as if consumers value (low) fuel
costs. In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that gasoline and/or carbon taxes may be
e®ective instruments in mitigating the negative externalities associated with gasoline combustion in
automobiles. The results do not speak, however, to the optimal magnitude of any policy responses;
we leave that important matter to future research.
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21A Elasticity Bias
In our introductory remarks, we argued informally that structural estimation can understate con-
sumer responsiveness to fuel costs if it fails to account for manufacturer price responses. We
formalize our argument here in the context of logit demand. In particular, we demonstrate that
1) estimation yields a fuel cost coe±cient that is biased downwards and 2) one can estimate the
magnitude of bias with data on gasoline and manufacturer prices.
Under a set of standard (and restrictive) assumptions, the logit demand system generates the
well-known regression equation:
log(sjt) ¡ log(s0t) = Ã(pjt + xjt) + ·j + ºjt; (A-1)
where sjt and s0t are the market shares of vehicle j and the outside good, respectively, pjt is the
vehicle price, xjt captures the expected lifetime fuel costs, ·j is vehicle \quality," and ºjt is an error
term that captures demand shocks.
Assuming away the obvious endogeneity issues, one can use OLS with vehicle ¯xed e®ects to
obtain consistent estimates of Ã, the parameter of interest. However, suppose that one observes
the mean price of each vehicle rather than the true price. The regression equation becomes:




j = ·j+Ãpj and º¤
jt = ºjt+Ã(pjt¡pj). The problem is now apparent. Gasoline price shocks
a®ect not only xjt but also the composite error term º¤
jt through the manufacturer response. Since,
as we document above, adverse gasoline shocks typically induce manufacturers to lower prices, the
OLS estimate of Ã is biased downwards. Going further, the regression coe±cient has the expression:
b Ã = Ã +
P
(xjt ¡ xj)ºjt P
(xjt ¡ xj)2 +
P












Thus, it is possible to estimate the magnitude of bias simply by regressing vehicle prices on expected
lifetime fuel costs and a set of ¯xed e®ects; one need not have market share data or any other inputs
to the structural model.
Such a procedure has its di±culties. Perhaps the most central is constructing an appro-
priate proxy for expected lifetime fuel costs.42 We use the discounted price-per-mile, i.e., xjt =
(gpt=mpgj)=(1¡±); and impose a per-mile discount rate of ± = 0:999995401; this corresponds to an
annual discount rate of 0.95, assuming 11,154 miles per year.43 We measure manufacturer prices in
dollars, rather than thousands of dollars, to sidestep any problems associated with unit conversion.
We then regress manufacturer prices on lifetime fuel costs, vehicle ¯xed e®ects, and time ¯xed
e®ects. The resulting coe±cient of -0.141 (standard error = 0:019) corresponds to a downward bias
of 14 percent.44
42Of course, structural estimation also requires one to proxy fuel costs. Goldberg (1998), Bento et al (2005) and
Jacobsen (2007) all use measures based on price-per-mile.
43The Department of Transportation estimates the average vehicle lifespan to be thirteen years and 145,000 miles;
based on these data, the average number of miles per year is 11,154.
44The calculation is sensitive to the discount rate. An annual discount rate of 0.99 produces a bias of 2.7 percent;
22Although we hope our empirical estimate of bias provides a useful benchmark, we caution
against taking the calculation too literally. Data imperfections and/or speci¯cation errors could
result in an estimate that is too high or too low. For example, our measure of manufacturer prices
is based on incentives o®ered to consumers and does not fully capture transaction prices or even the
actual incentives selected. Our proxy for expected lifetime fuel costs imposes both a speci¯c form
of multiplicative discounting and an arbitrary discount rate. Aside from these estimation issues,
the bias formula itself is based on logit assumptions that are generally considered too restrictive.
More °exible structural models still understate consumer responsiveness to fuel costs { the negative
correlation between fuel costs and unobserved price responses remains { but the bias is nonlinear
and could be substantially larger or smaller than what we estimate here.
B Analytical solutions to the theoretical model
B.1 Three single-vehicle manufacturers
We derive analytical solutions to the theoretical model for the speci¯c case of three single-product
manufacturers that compete in prices. The pro¯t equation speci¯ed in Equation 1 takes the form:
¼j = (pj ¡ cj) ¤ qj(e p¢) ¡ fj; (B1-1)
where pj is the price of vehicle j, the scalar cj captures the marginal cost of production, the quantity
demanded qj is a function of the \full" vehicle price, inclusive of fuel costs, and fj is a ¯xed cost.
We specify the linear demand system:
qj = ®jj(pj + xj) +
X
k6=j
®jk(pk + xk) + ¹j (B1-2)
in which the scalar xj is the fuel cost of vehicle j, and the scalar ¹j is an exogenous demand shifter.
We are concerned with the case in which demand is well-de¯ned (so that ®jj < 0 8j) and vehicles
are substitutes (so that ®jk > 0 8j 6= k). The ¯rst-order condition for the equilibrium price of





















(pk + xk) (B1-3)
an annual discount rate of 0.90 produces a bias of 28.9 percent.
23We solve the system of equations for the equilibrium vehicle prices as functions of the non-price



















































































































































































The equilibrium prices for vehicles 2 and 3 are analogous. One can combine the two competitor
fuel cost terms into a single term that captures the in°uence of the weighted average competitor

























¤ (!12x2 + !13x3); (B1-5)













































A single regularity condition generates the following results regarding the relationship between





























Thus, in any empirical implementation, one should expect that the regression coe±cient on fuel
costs should be negative, that the coe±cient on the weighted average competitor fuel costs should
be positive, and that the ¯rst coe±cient should be larger in magnitude than the second. If one
proxies cumulative fuel costs using a measure of current fuel costs { for example, the \price per-
mile" variable that we employ { then the coe±cients may be much larger than one in magnitude.
24The same regularity condition generates the following results regarding the weights:








Since the parameters ®12 and ®13 govern the severity of competition between vehicles, it is appro-
priate to weight \closer" competitors more heavily when constructing the empirical proxies for the


































































The condition holds provided that the own-price parameters are su±ciently large relatively to the
cross-price parameters. For intuition, it may be useful to note that each right-hand-side term
enters as a positive because the own-price parameters are negative and the cross-price parameters
are positive. Although these results extend naturally to cases with J > 3 manufacturers, the
algebraic burden associated with obtaining analytical solutions increases exponentially with J.
B.2 One manufacturer with three vehicles
We derive analytical solutions to the theoretical model for the speci¯c case of a single manufac-
turer that produces three distinct products. The ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization are






®jk(pkt + xkt) + ¹jt +
X
k
®kj(pkt ¡ ckt) = 0: (B2-1)
25We solve the system of equations for the equilibrium vehicle prices as functions of the non-price




































































































































































where, for brevity, we focus on the fuel cost terms. Again, one can combine the fuel cost terms of
vehicles 2 and 3 into a single term that captures the weighted average in°uence of these vehicles.





































Thus, the manufacturer partially o®sets changes in fuel costs of a speci¯c vehicle with changes in
price of that vehicle. Changes in the fuel costs of other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer,
however, have ambiguous implications for the vehicle price. Interestingly, in the speci¯c case of
symmetric demand (i.e., ®jk = ®kj 8 j;k), changes in the fuel costs of other vehicles produced
by the same manufacturer have no e®ect on the equilibrium price. The regularity condition that

















































The condition holds provided that the own-price parameters are su±ciently large relatively to the
cross-price parameters. Again, the intuition underlying these results extends naturally to cases
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Retail Gasoline Prices by Region
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Seasonally Adjusted Retail Gasoline Prices
Figure 2: Seasonally adjusted retail gasoline prices at the national level over 1993-2008, in real
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Miles Per Gallon
The Effect of a $1 Increase in the Gasoline Price
Figure 3: The estimated e®ects of a one dollar increase in the retail gasoline price on the manu-
facturer price, based on the regression results in Column 1 of Table 3. Each point represents the















































The Effect of a $1 Increase in the Gasoline Price
Figure 4: The estimated e®ects of a one dollar increase in the retail gasoline price on the manu-
facturer price, based on the regression results of Appendix Table A-1. Each point represents the




















































Manufacturer Offsets of Gasoline Price Changes
Figure 5: The percentages of consumer cumulative gasoline expenses, due to changes in the retail
gasoline price, that are o®set by changes in the manufacturer price. Each point represents the
percentage for a single vehicle. Based on back-of-the-envelope calculations and the regression















































Vehicle Type = Car
The Effect of a $1 Increase in the Gasoline Price
Figure 6: The estimated e®ects of a one dollar increase in the retail gasoline price on the manu-
facturer price, based on the regression results of Appendix Table A-1. Each point represents the















































Vehicle Type = SUV
The Effect of a $1 Increase in the Gasoline Price
Figure 7: The estimated e®ects of a one dollar increase in the retail gasoline price on the manu-
facturer price, based on the regression results of Appendix Table A-1. Each point represents the
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Demand and Cost Factors
Figure 8: Time-series plots of time ¯xed e®ects together with selected demand and cost factors.
There are 208 weekly values over 2003-2008. The time ¯xed e®ects are estimated in the regression











































The Effect of a $1 Increase in the Gasoline Price
Figure 9: The estimated e®ects of a one dollar increase in the retail gasoline price for a hypothetical,
\perfectly average" vehicle, in the ten weeks following a gasoline price shock. A perfectly average
vehicle is one whose miles-per-gallon, weighted-average competitor miles-per-gallon, and weighted-
average same-¯rm miles-per-gallon are all at the mean (for cars the mean is 25.99; for SUVs it is
18.80). The impulse response function is calculated based on the regression coe±cients shown in
Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables De¯nition Mean St. Dev.
Manufacturer price MSRPj ¡ INCjrt 30.344 16.262
Fuel cost gprt=mpgj 0.108 0.034
MSRP MSRPj 30.782 16.299
Miles-per-gallon mpgj 21.555 5.964
Horsepower 224.123 71.451
Wheel base 115.193 12.168
Passenger capacity 4.911 1.633
Means and standard deviations based on 299,855 vehicle-region-week ob-
servations over the period 2003-2006. The manufacturer price is de¯ned
as MSRP minus the mean regional and national incentives (in thousands).
The fuel cost is the gasoline price divided by miles-per-gallon, and cap-
tures the gasoline expense per mile. The manufacturer price, the fuel cost,
and MSRP (in thousands) are in real 2006 dollars; wheel base is measured
in inches.
32Table 2: Means by Vehicle Type
Variables Cars SUVs Trucks Vans
Manufacturer price 30.301 35.782 24.482 24.658
Fuel cost 0.087 0.121 0.133 0.120
MSRP 30.835 36.124 24.881 25.048
Miles-per-gallon 25.991 18.803 17.121 18.815
Horsepower 209.947 241.858 254.383 191.152
Wheel base 107.723 114.880 129.527 123.196
Passenger capacity 4.799 5.849 3.763 4.451
# of observations 125,660 90,270 46,615 37,310
Means based on vehicle-region-week observations over the period 2003-
2006. The manufacturer price is de¯ned as MSRP minus the mean regional
and national incentives (in thousands). The fuel cost is the gasoline price
divided by miles-per-gallon, and captures the gasoline expense per mile.
The manufacturer price, the fuel cost, and MSRP (in thousands) are in
real 2006 dollars; wheel base is measured in inches.




Variables (1) (2) (3)
Fuel cost -55.40*** -56.96*** -63.75***
(7.73) (7.86) (8.77)
Average competitor 50.76*** 50.16*** 50.09***
fuel cost (7.15) (7.39) (8.12)
Average same-¯rm 1.15 2.62 1.31
fuel cost (2.29) (1.78) (2.30)
R2 0.5260 0.6763 0.5289
# of observations 299,855 299,855 59,971
# of vehicles 681 681 681
Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the manufac-
turer price, i.e., MSRP minus the mean regional and/or national incen-
tives (in thousands). The units of observation in Columns 1 and 2 are at
the vehicle-week-region level. The units of observation in Column 3 are
at the vehicle-week level. All regressions include vehicle and time ¯xed
e®ects, and Columns 1 and 2 include region ¯xed e®ects. The regressions
also include third-order polynomials in the vehicle age (i.e., weeks since
the date of initial production), the average age of vehicles produced by
di®erent manufacturers, and the average age of other vehicles produced
by the same manufacturer. Standard errors are clustered at the vehicle
level and shown in parenthesis. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
34Table 4: Gasoline Price Lags and Futures Prices
Variables Metric (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fuel cost Lagged -64.55*** -36.51*** -30.08***
Retail (8.77) (10.65) (8.42)
Average competitor Lagged 50.01*** 23.19** 30.24***
fuel cost Retail (8.16) (10.09) (9.93)
Fuel cost Futures -47.66*** -35.52** -31.69***
(7.11) (16.42) (9.39)
Average competitor Futures 63.32*** 19.87 27.73**
fuel cost (10.44) (24.95) (13.21)
Fuel cost Retail -29.70*** -22.58
(10.83) (16.46)
Average competitor Retail 27.70*** 33.38*
fuel cost (8.14) (18.87)
R2 0.5291 0.5286 0.5295 0.5295 0.5305
Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the manufacturer price, i.e., MSRP minus the mean
national incentive (in thousands). The sample includes 59,971 observations on 681 vehicles at the vehicle-week
level. Fuel cost variables labeled \lagged retail" are constructed using the mean retail gasoline price over the
previous four weeks. Fuel cost variables labeled \futures" are constructed using the one-month futures price
of retail gasoline. Fuel cost variables labeled \retail" are constructed using the current retail gasoline price.
All regressions include the appropriate average same-¯rm fuel cost variable(s). The regressions also include
vehicle and time ¯xed e®ects, as well as third-order polynomials in the vehicle age (i.e., weeks since the date
of initial production), the average age of vehicles produced by di®erent manufacturers, and the average age of
other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer. Standard errors are clustered at the vehicle level and shown
in parenthesis. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
35Table 5: Demand and Cost Factors
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gasoline Price -0.015 0.011 -0.102 -0.096
(0.036) (0.059) (0.088) (0.067)
Interest Rate -0.128*** -0.164***
(0.027) (0.034)
Unemployment Rate -0.315*** -0.104
(0.073) (0.091)
Electricity Price Index 0.950* 2.832***
(0.540) (0.726)
Steel Price Index 0.405*** 0.549***
(0.113) (0.152)
R2 0.5160 0.6117 0.5829 0.6454
Results from OLS regressions. The data include 208 weekly observations over the
period 2003-2006. The dependent variable is the time ¯xed e®ect estimated in
Column 3 of Table 3. The regressions also include 52 week ¯xed e®ects; equivalent
weeks in each year are constrained to have the same ¯xed e®ect. Standard errors
are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and ¯rst-order autocorrelation.
Statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
36Table 6: Manufacturer Prices, Fuel Costs, and Inventories
Variables (1) (2)
Fuel cost -69.23*** -69.11***
(11.57) (11.54)
Average competitor 53.16*** 53.00***
fuel cost (9.79) (9.76)
Average same-¯rm 1.95 1.94




Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the
manufacturer price, i.e., MSRP minus the mean national incen-
tive (in thousands). The sample includes 41,822 observations on
500 vehicles over the period 2003-2006, at the vehicle-week level.
The regressions include vehicle and time ¯xed e®ects, as well as
third-order polynomials in the vehicle age (i.e., weeks since the
date of initial production), the average age of vehicles produced
by di®erent manufacturers, and the average age of other vehicles
produced by the same manufacturer. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the vehicle level and shown in parenthesis. Statistical




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table A-3: Multiple Fuel Cost Lags { Cars
Variables Weeks Lagged GM Ford Chrysler Toyota
Fuel cost 0 -37.39 -50.31 -46.24 -81.33***
Fuel cost 1 -3.56 -13.28 5.21 22.78*
Fuel cost 2 -19.01 -36.08** -78.41* -2.99
Fuel cost 3 17.41 -46.24** -18.12 17.15
Fuel cost 4 18.63 -5.47 -17.10 -18.97
Fuel cost 5 8.79 7.48 18.23 11.85
Fuel cost 6 -29.07*** 21.31** 66.43* -26.99***
Fuel cost 7 13.72 8.66 29.70 -0.59
Fuel cost 8 9.20 -55.16*** -29.28 -2.15
Fuel cost 9 38.37** 61.03*** 87.15 15.40
Fuel cost 10 -128.67*** -76.56* -186.37* -19.28
Competitor fuel cost 0 62.56** 96.30 179.61** 39.14**
Competitor fuel cost 1 -6.61 -50.99 -33.56** -8.47
Competitor fuel cost 2 14.27 13.95 -0.29 4.88
Competitor fuel cost 3 8.94 -0.07 -29.92 -4.58
Competitor fuel cost 4 -7.34 -12.45 17.16** -5.11*
Competitor fuel cost 5 4.24 -4.73 0.70 6.23
Competitor fuel cost 6 -14.43 -11.32 3.00 3.67
Competitor fuel cost 7 11.55 18.85 -8.89 1.24
Competitor fuel cost 8 0.78 -30.56 39.08 1.67
Competitor fuel cost 9 -19.88 38.13 -48.17 -5.92*
Competitor fuel cost 10 24.95 16.55 53.38 2.42
Same-¯rm fuel cost 0 -38.58 -58.84 -130.65 24.22
Same-¯rm fuel cost 1 10.12 58.21*** 27.63 -12.61
Same-¯rm fuel cost 2 1.84 18.16 77.65 -6.11
Same-¯rm fuel cost 3 -27.85 42.70* 45.63 -12.74
Same-¯rm fuel cost 4 -13.41 14.15 1.77 20.82
Same-¯rm fuel cost 5 -15.89 -9.79 -20.53 -20.91
Same-¯rm fuel cost 6 41.49*** -16.04 -71.12* 19.82**
Same-¯rm fuel cost 7 -26.16 -27.69 -23.03 -1.58
Same-¯rm fuel cost 8 -13.21 77.31*** -6.22 -2.72
Same-¯rm fuel cost 9 -17.86 -95.73*** -44.45 -8.20
Same-¯rm fuel cost 10 93.18** 36.61 139.47 5.50
Results from four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the manufacturer price, i.e., MSRP minus the
mean regional and national incentives (in thousands). The units of observation are at the vehicle-week-region
level. All regressions include vehicle, time, and region ¯xed e®ects, as well as third-order polynomials in the
vehicle age (i.e., weeks since the date of initial production), the average age of vehicles produced by di®erent
manufacturers, and the average age of other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer. Standard errors are
clustered at the vehicle level but omitted for brevity. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
40Table A-4: Multiple Fuel Cost Lags { SUVs
Variables Weeks Lagged GM Ford Chrysler Toyota
Fuel cost 0 -71.20** -43.14* -83.16** -53.31***
Fuel cost 1 19.08* 14.33 57.27** 8.93
Fuel cost 2 -7.88 -26.46 24.12 -3.87
Fuel cost 3 -17.00 1.86 7.55 -0.311
Fuel cost 4 15.59 -10.92 22.44** 5.93
Fuel cost 5 -11.67 9.79 3.11 -8.23**
Fuel cost 6 14.21 -5.77 3.41 -26.99***
Fuel cost 7 12.78 4.16 0.93 6.12
Fuel cost 8 -26.82** -2.80 -3.14 -2.73
Fuel cost 9 16.32 9.02 11.18 7.51
Fuel cost 10 -26.35 -31.32 13.24 -31.48***
Competitor fuel cost 0 54.88*** 51.93** -47.89 19.78
Competitor fuel cost 1 -17.24*** -2.81 26.82 7.39
Competitor fuel cost 2 13.70** -1.54 5.40 1.49
Competitor fuel cost 3 0.64 1.41 -4.15 -8.32
Competitor fuel cost 4 -10.06 -12.30 7.75 6.37
Competitor fuel cost 5 1.93 3.82 -14.28 -4.54
Competitor fuel cost 6 -1.86 4.04 16.51 10.18**
Competitor fuel cost 7 -3.10 13.56* -9.35 4.41
Competitor fuel cost 8 5.59 3.78 -7.94 12.13**
Competitor fuel cost 9 7.89 6.02 22.83 -10.01
Competitor fuel cost 10 23.06* 0.60 -36.55 6.40
Same-¯rm fuel cost 0 14.05 -10.78 132.23* 22.83
Same-¯rm fuel cost 1 -3.03 -11.78 -86.08* -15.56
Same-¯rm fuel cost 2 -6.04 27.00 -29.04 0.12
Same-¯rm fuel cost 3 15.90 -3.69 -4.66 8.66
Same-¯rm fuel cost 4 -7.62 21.91 -29.28* -15.09*
Same-¯rm fuel cost 5 8.73 -14.59 10.42 10.50
Same-¯rm fuel cost 6 -13.94 1.12 -21.26 -9.30
Same-¯rm fuel cost 7 -10.22 -17.76 8.46 -10.77
Same-¯rm fuel cost 8 20.09 2.19 11.08 -11.27
Same-¯rm fuel cost 9 -8.55 -14.54 -34.20 4.19
Same-¯rm fuel cost 10 -1.68 26.61 24.88 17.74
Results from four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the manufacturer price, i.e., MSRP minus the
mean regional and national incentives (in thousands). The units of observation are at the vehicle-week-region
level. All regressions include vehicle, time, and region ¯xed e®ects, as well as third-order polynomials in the
vehicle age (i.e., weeks since the date of initial production), the average age of vehicles produced by di®erent
manufacturers, and the average age of other vehicles produced by the same manufacturer. Standard errors are
clustered at the vehicle level but omitted for brevity. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
41